Response to Bridgette ("Harm From Death")

Bridgette asked if animals (and humans for that matter) truly are harmed by death, as Kaldewaij suggests, if they can't reflect on their lost time and experiences, since they are dead. I think this is a really interesting question. When I first read Kaldeqaij's article I agreed with her that animals are harmed by death. However, now that I'm thinking about it more, I think it is morally wrong to unnecessarily end an animals life, but it does not harm the animal. If an animal isn't aware that it is about to die, or it isn't capable of understanding the concept of death (these are two big ifs), then it is not harmed by a painless death. I would say the same thing for humans; if a human wasn't aware that it was about to die then I don't think the human was harmed (if it was done painlessly). I understand I am taking some leaps here by saying that 1) the death must be painless, 2) the animal can't know it is going to die, and 3) the animal can't understand the concept of death, but if these three things are true then I don't agree with Kaldewaij that animals are harmed by death.

With that being said, I do think it is morally wrong to end an animals life (not including special cases). Even though an animal wont know it is missing out on its future, you are still taking something from the animal. If you steal from somebody, and the person never notices, it was still wrong. However, maybe this is like Kant's argument about kicking the dog; it is morally wrong to steal from someone who wont notice or end an unsuspecting animal's life because it harms the character of the person doing these things. My question is: Do we tend to do the right thing because it is good for other people, or because it is good for ourselves?